Abstract
Introduction
In many ways, since the introduction of shared parental leave (SPL) in 2015 1 , the familyfriendly framework of rights now appears complete: mothers and fathers can 'take advantage of additional flexibility in the way they choose to care for a new arrival to the family' 2 and this builds upon a fairly generous maternity leave entitlement, a right to paternity leave, a right to request flexible working and protection against discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity. The EU has also developed its reconciliation agenda over the years and this, in the main, has positively influenced national laws. 3 But, as will be argued in the following section, appearances can be deceptive and the existing package of rights available to working parents is flawed: it remains focussed, in practice, on new mothers and does little to help challenge traditional constructions of care as a female responsibility or challenge the dominant ethos of the labour market, which promotes the *I would like to thank Nicole Busby, Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella, Simon Deakin, colleagues at Reading School of Law and the anonymous reviewers for useful feedback on previous drafts of this article. Any errors are, of course, my own. unencumbered worker 4 as ideal and fails to reflect the interdependence of care across our life course. Moreover these (flawed) laws are not adequately supported by the current dispute resolution infrastructure and processes, and exist at a time when successive governments have failed to effectively tackle pregnancy and maternity related workplace discrimination. In addition, austerity measures and related reforms have increased the vulnerability of many workers, weakening the ability of these laws to adequately protect those who are mistreated in the workplace as a result of pregnancy or care-giving responsibilities. 5 These key concerns are discussed in detail below: section 2 considers (a) the legal framework of rights 6 and (b) the dispute resolution procedures in place. In the latter, particular attention is given to their ineffectiveness as a means of supporting those who experience unlawful treatment at work due to pregnancy and maternity. Section 3 then outlines how an alternative approach, based upon care ethics, could potentially help promote a framework that better reflects the inter-dependence of care and better challenges gendered constructions of care-work and labour market participation.
The limits of existing provisions
Overall, many of the inadequacies of family-friendly employment laws and the processes that support their enforcement reflect the fact that developments in this area of social policy are precarious: vulnerable to economic downturns and often shelved or diluted when perceived and presented as a burden on business. Family-friendly policies are rarely prioritised for long enough to ensure that policy makers engage with the issues in a meaningful way. Indeed, the topic fell out of the policy spotlight when priorities shifted in 6 Although, given that the majority of established rights have received considerable academic attention, the majority of critique in this section is of the new shared parental leave provisions.
in relation to work-life balance policies across the EU, a weakness in framing legislation by focussing, as this area of social policy often does, on the business case. As they put it, 'significant changes in priorities can be expected in a context where businesses can afford to be less concerned about retaining staff, welfare state expenditure is being cut back and the EU and national governments can no longer assume that work is available to all who seek it'. 7 An example in the UK is the shelving by New Labour of plans to extend the payment of statutory maternity pay (SMP) to a full year due to the economic instability caused by recession. Such re-prioritisation reflects the continued undervaluing of parenting and care in general. 8 In this section, two examples demonstrate the inadequacy of the current approach: the limits of the legal framework of rights available and the dispute resolution procedures are discussed.
a. Limits of the current legal framework
At the core of the package of rights on offer is a generous maternity leave entitlement 9 that has been extended several times and is available to employees 10 including those who adopt and, more recently, those who have a baby through a surrogacy arrangement. 13 Defined as beginning 'when the pregnancy begins, and ends -(a) if she has the right to ordinary and additional maternity leave, at the end of the additional maternity leave period or (if earlier) when she returns to work after the pregnancy; (b)if she does not have that right, at the end of the period of 2 weeks beginning with the end of the pregnancy' (s18(6)). The employer does however need to be aware of the pregnancy in order to trigger legal protection - replaced by shared parental leave (SPL). APL was, at the time, a momentous step forward in terms of father-friendly employment rights. It allowed fathers and partners to take paternity leave of up to 26 weeks (minimum of two weeks) before the child's first birthday. The father had to satisfy the same continuity criteria as for paternity leave. Significantly though, it was only available if the mother returned to work early and transferred the remainder of her leave entitlement to him and it could be paid if the mother transferred leave where she would have been eligible for SMP. The APL provisions were, thus, tangled up with the mother's leave and did little to challenge the normative expectation that mothers are primarily responsible for, and that they are the most naturally inclined towards and most adept at, caring for children -a patriarchal construction that has long been contested in feminist literature.
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The EU parental leave provisions add another layer of rights to these parental entitlements.
The Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 23 offer some parents the opportunity to take up to 18 weeks leave 24 before the child's 18 th birthday. 25 However, the entitlement is restricted in a number of ways: it is only available to employees with a year's continuous employment, has to be taken in blocks of one week minimum and 4 weeks maximum, can be delayed by employers if to grant it would unduly disrupt the functioning of the workplace, and, most significantly, it is unpaid. Its use is therefore fundamentally limited, reflecting the significantly weak engagement with work-care issues at EU level.
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To this framework of employment rights the previous (Coalition) Government to eligible adopting parents and those intending to have a child born through a surrogacy 27 arrangement. Although the first two weeks maternity leave following childbirth remain compulsory (four weeks for factory workers), 28 under the SPL provisions a woman who is eligible for statutory maternity/adoptive leave and pay is now entitled to bring both of these to an early end and elect for SPL instead. This new provision builds upon, but is subtly different from, the APL provisions. 29 Under the latter, a mother could transfer a block of up to 26 weeks maternity leave entitlement (post compulsory leave) if she chose to return to work early. SPL allows eligible parents more flexibility to share the leave in various ways: for example they may choose to take some leave at the same time or take it in turns to have periods of leave to look after the child. Indeed, even if the mother has no eligible partner with whom to share that leave, the provision may still offer her some flexibility in terms of when and how she uses her leave entitlement -perhaps returning to paid employment for a block of time whilst a partner or grandparent or other carer is able to care for her child. In addition, where a father is entitled to SPL and pay and a mother isn't, perhaps because she is self-employed, the father can take SPL while the mother returns to work -a situation that was not possible previously as the APL entitlement was intrinsically tied to and dependent upon the right of the mother to statutory maternity leave.
However, there are flaws in the new provisions. First, the core SPL rights are fairly complex.
This, unlike maternity leave, is not a day-one right. There are separate criteria for the mother and father/partner and separate criteria for SPL and SPL pay and these also include various notice requirements. The scope for confusion in understanding these eligibility conditions and notice requirements is vast. 30 Both parties wanting to take SPL must give 27 See Caracciolo di Torella and Foubert, supra n.11.There are also now plans to extend SPL to include working grandparents by 2018 (see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-announcesmajor-new-extension-of-shared-parental-leave-and-pay-to-working-grandparents) whilst the benefit of adequate notice to workplace functioning is clear, the reality of childbirth and parenting -workplace reconciliation is at odds with this dogmatic approach.
The implications of this in the light of cuts in legal aid funding and the closure of many legal advice centres is of particular concern (see further below) and tarnishes the initial gloss of SPL.
Second, SPL is paid at the flat statutory rate from day one, whereas SMP is linked to the mother's earnings for the first six week. Hence, a couple contemplating sharing the childcare during this initial period following the birth may well be reluctant to elect for SPL if to do so has negative financial implications for the family. This period post the birth can be particularly intense for most couples but even more so where, for example, the birth was by caesarean or complicated in some way, there were multiple births or the family have other care-giving responsibilities. Adopting parents might also feel that this period of https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417505/bis-14-1329-Employers-technical-guide-to-shared-parental-leave-and-pay-1.pdf).
adjustment would benefit from having both parties present. Yet, the flexibility provided in theory by SPL is, because of the financial consequences, unlikely to be a realistic option for many. The equal parenting ideal at the heart of SPL is, in practice, compromised by restricted financial practicalities during the first six weeks -and potentially longer if the mother is able to access a preferential occupational maternity leave package.
In addition to the core leave provisions outlined so far, a key initiative that gives working parents, and carers with elderly dependants, a group that is often underrepresented in this debate, 31 a useful right, beyond legislation that focusses on the first 12 months post birth is the right to request flexible working. 32 It allows eligible employees to ask for modifications to be made in terms of how, when and where they work, providing these parents with the opportunity to re-structure their working lives in a way that eases the pressures involved with providing daily informal care and participating in employment. An employee must have been employed continuously for 26 weeks before s/he can request to work flexibly. Overall, the ability of early conciliation to deliver an effective service that responds to the needs of the individual parties has been questioned. 50 For those who have experienced pregnancy or maternity related discrimination, this additional stage of the process presents a huge challenge -especially as the commitment required is so lengthy and isolating. Claimants are estimated to spend an average of 27 hours on the dispute which is a huge commitment for most, especially those with newborns 51 .
Moreover, ACAS guidance states that the conciliator does not 'take a view on the merits of a claim or advise whether a claim should be made' or 'help prepare either a case for tribunal or a defence to a claim'. 52 Hence what is marketed as being 'quicker, cheaper and less stressful for all concerned than a tribunal case' 53 might be perceived negatively by individuals for whom resolution equates to correct enforcement of relevant law, as opposed to a means of simply bringing the dispute to an end regardless of the merits of the claim. As Dickens notes in relation to the older system of ACAS pre-claim conciliation before it was compulsory, but the point is even more poignant in this new context, the claimants might look to the conciliation officer to redress the imbalance of power that they experience but ACAS 'act as a broker' rather than 'an advisor'. 54 Third, even if a potential claimant is, in the current climate, able to grapple with the legal framework and willing to engage with compulsory conciliation -if she does not reach a satisfactory agreement her propensity to enforce her legal rights at an employment tribunal is now significantly reduced by the fact that she will probably need to pay a substantial fee to do so. 55 For many this is the last nail in the coffin and there is growing evidence of aggrieved workers with well-founded claims feeling unable to pursue an action once aware of the fees. 56 In force since July 2013 57 these fees apply to all potential claimants and EAT appellants, unless they qualify for a remission which, according to ministers, protects the lowest paid workers, but analysis by the TUC has shown that very few households actually benefit from this scheme.
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There are two levels of fees -issue and hearing fees and the fee level differentiates between straight forward (type A) and more complex (type B) claims: for type A cases an issue fee of £160 and a hearing fee, if applicable, of £230 is imposed and for type B
cases an issue fee of £250 and hearing fee of £950 is imposed. If, in due course, the claimant wants to appeal the ET decision a further fee of £400 is charged to lodge the case at the EAT and £1,200 is charged for the hearing. Pregnancy and maternity related discrimination claims, especially when there is a claim for unfair dismissal, are likely to be categorised as type B. It is unsurprising that, since the introduction of these fees, tribunal claims have reduced significantly. Initial downturns were starkthere was a 79% drop in the number of applications lodged from October to 55 The government is reviewing tribunal fees: (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/434207/tor-employmenttribunal-fees.pdf) -an announcement made only weeks before UNISON's judicial review claim was due to be heard at the Court of Appeal. The Commons Select Committee is also investigating court and tribunal fees, with a particular focus on access to justice and, unlike the MOJ investigation, plans to engage with external bodies as part of its assessment (see http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-az/commons-select/justice-committee/news-parliament-20151/courts-tribunals-fees-charges-inquiry/). Fees are to be scrapped in Scotland -placing greater pressure on the government to re-think the current provisions. December 2013, compared with the same period in 2012 59 There was a further decline as claims for the period October to December 2014 was down 12% on the same period the previous year and there has been no revival since. 60 These fees, of course, need to be placed in the context of a significant rise in the cost of living -which has been compounded by widespread pay freezes, and cuts to social security benefits (such as child benefit) and the new Conservative Government has announced plans for further significant cuts to welfare expenditure, described by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies as 'regressive'. 61 These fees are a huge deterrent to legal action for many, 62 but for pregnant and new parents the fees have repercussions beyond that of other litigants and compounds the difficulties faced when deciding whether or not to pursue a claim. Pregnancy and maternity related discrimination 'disproportionately affects low-paid women workers, who have less economic bargaining power and are more likely to be in precarious employment'. 63 Moreover, the arrival, or imminent arrival, of a new baby has additional financial repercussions -such as baby merchandise, the likely cost of leave without the security of paid employment and the potential loss of future earning capacity and/ or the future cost of childcare. 64 Flaws in the dispute resolution framework present a challenge for all claimants but pregnant workers and new parents, 65 albeit to different degrees, face additional considerations that make contemplating litigation incredibly difficult. Indeed, it also significantly reduces the deterrent effect of the law which could result in increased incidence. 66 I suggested, in 2009, that pregnant women and new mothers when faced with the reality of bringing an action 'might understandably be exasperated by the whole ordeal'. 67 There are now new hurdles to be encountered, or at least existing ones have become ridiculously high, in bringing a legal action. In June 2013 a BIS Committee of MPs recommended abolition of the tribunal fees in pregnancy discrimination cases, noting evidence that 'the fees will effectively deter women with well-founded pregnancy discrimination claims from taking action in the tribunal' and evidence from Sarah Veale of the TUC suggests that 'women tend to be lowpaid and will be much more likely to be put off litigation simply because they cannot afford the risk that they might not get those fees back'. 68 The Committee concluded that 'pregnancy discrimination, by definition, affects women only and such a financial burden on those women would be in direct contradiction with the Government's aim of removing inequality in the workplace'. In addition, the severity of these hurdles is compounded by the fact that very few of those who attempt them actually succeed if their cases get to a full tribunal hearing 69 and many of those who are successful do not receive their full award: one in three reported to receive none at all.
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At present, there is a real sense that far too many employers who discriminate against pregnant workers and new mothers still 'get away with it' 71 and ten years after the EOC declared that 'we all have greater expectations' very little has been done to tackle the problem. Nowhere is this more evident than in the voices of those who have experienced pregnancy and maternity related discrimination at work: the following anonymous extract from the website 'pregnantthenscrewed' 72 was posted on June 23 rd 2015. In many ways this individual represents the ideal litigant, willing to challenge unlawful behaviour through legal means. Unfortunately, she also epitomises the unacceptably high individual sacrifice that is needed in such cases and underscores why we need to re-think our approach to the issue as a whole. 67 James, supra n.10 at [91] . http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmbis/342/342.pdf 69 Dunstan, supra n.56. 70 BIS press release -'Government considering new powers to tackle non-payment of tribunal awards' (01/11/13). 71 Dunstan, supra n.56. 72 See http://pregnantthenscrewed.com/. The site was created in 2015 by Joeli Brearley who experienced horrific pregnancy related discrimination and wanted to create 'a place for women to tell their stories anonymously, giving victims a voice, while demonstrating how systematic the problem really is'.
'Before I got pregnant, I had over 5 years continuous service… At the time that I notified my manager I was pregnant, I covered contracts nationally throughout the UK. I was held in high regard, my time was very sought after, and I was responsible for the performance of over 50 admin staff, as well as developing and maintaining relationships with our clients on multi-million pound contracts. Soon after I notified my employer I was pregnant, they informed me I would receive only SMP... My employer refused to adhere to the TUPE regulations... I raised [a] grievance, and while this happened, a company wide pay rise of 2.8% was implemented. I was not given the pay rise. I managed to find out that, in a company with over 1000 employees, only 7 people had not received that pay rise. 5 of them had recently had a promotion and an associated pay increase higher than 2.8%, and 1 was leaving before the pay increase would be implemented. The 7th person was me. …The tribunal went ahead. I had to leave my 12 week old baby for 5 full days. I had to pump breastmilk in a room with my legal representation and her student present (I used a cover but it's not quite the same as privacy!) as that was the only available space. I had to ask the tribunal office to store my milk in their fridge. It was embarrassing and demeaning.
After a harrowing week… the tribunal… found that my employer [had] discriminated against me on the basis of my gender in 3 separate instances… They also ruled that the employer had excluded me from the national pay rise unlawfully and that they must apply it both immediately and retrospectively to the date it was originally issued… My employer offered me an out of court settlement and I accepted it.'
Care ethics
The discussion above provides a clear illustration of law's struggle to, in Herring's words, 'respond to issues which are not readily reducible to an economic value nor expressed in terms of individualised rights'. 73 The law here, as elsewhere, fails to reflect the interdependent nature of care relationships and constructs relevant provisions as a bundle of specific individual rights rather than a means of enabling realistic choices and agency within families 74 . In this section I argue in favour of an approach that helps challenge the current marginalisation of care, contending that care ethics might be utilised to help illuminate and counter the damaging trends discussed above.
Originally Gilligan's ethic of care 75 sought simply to challenge implicit gendered assumptions about moral development and reasoning in young boys and girls -arguing that they were 'different' but that females are not less efficient than males in this regard. Gilligan's work has since received considerable negative attention, especially from dominance theorists 76 and its valorisation of a 'female voice' has been viewed as problematic 77 -believed to associate care with women and hence perpetuate a norm that excludes men, or presents male carers as the exception to the rule. 78 One does not, however, have to subscribe to the view that all females are innately caring, self-sacrificing and nurturing (or any more capable of these traits than men) 79 to assert, as I do here, that greater promotion of an ethic of care could radically transform institutions and legal rights and the values that underpin them in this context. Indeed, her work has been developed from a range of perspectives 80 and its analysis'. 81 At its core is a belief that care, although it varies across a person's life course, is a universal experience and need and a valuable endeavour that deserves to be better recognised. Hence, many care ethicists promote the view that mutual care is essential and dispute any claim that it is a gendered phenomenon. As Tronto put it, 'care is not a parochial concern of women, a type of secondary moral question, or the work of the least well off in society. Care is a central concern of human life'. 82 Those who favour an approach that centralises an ethic care challenge traditional liberal theories and their 'pretence' of independence and valorisation of the concept of 'choice' -traits that are often difficult for carers to relate to. 83 Once we accept these overarching traits of care ethics, its appeal in relation to critiquing law's engagement with care-work (formal or informal) is clear 84 as it calls us to 'change our political and social institutions to reflect this truth'. 85 In political Three examples illustrate how this (re)focus might alter key approaches to this area of social policy.
First, a greater commitment to care ethics can help promote men's role as care-giver.
Caregiving is slowly becoming less gendered in terms of our approach to it and, in practice, male and female identities as carers and workers are beginning to shift 88 . The desire to encourage men to take on a greater share of care-work has been discussed for some time 89 , often constructed as a means of helping promote equal parenting 90 and reducing the 'burden' of care 91 or enabling women to participate in the workplace more or at a higher level. More, however, needs to be done 92 in this field and an approach motivated by the core beliefs of care ethics could help transform the legal framework by challenging its individualistic approach and supporting the shifts we are witnessing by encouraging a better distribution of care responsibilities between individuals and communities: in fact helping (re)focus attention away from individual working mothers (or fathers) and onto families, communities and the welfare state. Women's participation in the labour market has been compromised because care-work has been individualised and assigned to women 93 conditions and paid at a rate that replaces a high degree of lost income. 100 Secondly, care ethics could also provide a means of improving the current dispute resolution system because the value it places on care-work requires that we remain vigilant to the potential impact of the procedures upon those who are pregnant or have care-giving responsibilities. Here, the value of care-work and its impact on law enforcement and access to justice has been completely ignored. Compulsory conciliation, for example, is constructed as the first step of the employment tribunal system procedure and this recent reform, like others before it, 101 is more concerned with reducing recourse to tribunals than with improving the effectiveness of dispute resolution or promoting broader social policy objectives. This conceptualisation manifests itself in the way that success or failure is often measured 102 : there is an assumption that a speedy resolution of claims caters for the needs of all litigants and yet, as suggested elsewhere, 103 this is not always the case for pregnant workers and new mothers. Moreover, the current dispute resolution model demonstrates no willingness to investigate or accommodate the practical and emotional needs of women, like the litigant quoted above, who have been treated unlawfully because of pregnancy or maternity. The debate surrounding tribunal fees, referred to above, provides further evidence of harm experienced as a result of a core failure to recognise the implications of care-work upon a person's ability to access justice following a dispute at work. The ramifications of this lack of attention to the lived reality for these individuals are difficult to quantify but potentially huge: as stated elsewhere, 'these well-intentioned procedures might operate in a way that marginalises those involved in pregnancy-parenting/workplace disputes'. 104 In sum, policy makers in this field still remain 'deaf', in Conaghan's sense of the word, 105 to the needs of these (potential) litigants and a greater regard for the care-work they undertake could shift our approach so as to enable their voices to be heard, and encourage investigations of a more innovative organisation of litigation support in general. 106 Thirdly, care ethics can help promote a framework of rights that better incorporates the needs and perspectives of those receiving care. Care ethics view people as relational, recognising that their own interests are often tied up with a concern for the interests of
others. Yet, as Herring suggests, laws often 'fall into the trap of isolating the interests of each party' 107 whereas 'approaches based on an ethic of care require the development of legal tools which recognise that separating interests into individual rights is impossible and undesirable'. 108 In relation to family-friendly laws, I have criticised elsewhere how child
care are not what has driven policy innovation in this area. If that were the case, we might be provided with provisions that better explore and facilitate children's needs beyond the first year -the focus of the majority of the legislation. As Fredman puts it, 'participative parenting is not confined to the first year of life, but extends throughout the child's school age years'. 110 We might also better encapsulate the realities of those with eldercare responsibilities -a type of care that differs, in so many ways, from childcare and requires a more nuanced approach.
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Care ethics could encourage, through recognition that care along with labour market demands 'does not have an unchanging place in today's society', 112 the development of more flexible policies so as to reflect that care needs change across time. It might, for example, facilitate changes to our current right to request provisions so that where conflicts arise between competing employees for flexibility the needs of working carers are prioritised above the desires of other workers, and this could be promoted in recognition of workers' needs but also, and preferably, to recognise the intermingled interests of those for whom they care. In addition, any agreed arrangement could also require ongoing review so as to accommodate the changing nature of care-giving and workplace demands and choices.
At present there is little or no space given to this reality within the current legal framework.
As a consequence, carers and recipients of care often have little choice but to resign themselves to traditional, often gendered, models of care-giving in order to accommodate care-work and workplace participation.
Conclusion
This discussion suggests how greater commitment to an ethic of care could alter the boundaries and nature of relevant laws and procedures in this field. Placing carers and recipients of care at the centre of dialogues can challenge the often unconscious, but resilient, over-privileging of the ideal unencumbered worker and allow a space for growth in awareness about, and a willingness to engage with the changing realities of 110 Fredman, supra n. 
